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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 





) Civil Action 





PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF ON RELIEF ISSUES 
I. Defendant's Brief Mostly Reargues 
Settled Questions Without Presenting Any New 
Reasons Why This Court Should Decide Them Differently Now 
This reply need not and does not devote much space in answer 
to Parts I and II of "Defendant's Post-Trial Brief on Remedial 
Issues." Part I simply restates defendant's position on 
liability. 
Part II seems to ask this Court to reaffirm its 1985 
position on constructive discharge with no new facts to support 
that action and no basis for thinking that the Court of Appeals 
would alter its 1987 contrary view. A great deal of energy is 
spent by defendant _wtrying to demonstrate that the Court of 
Appeals' decision on constructive discharge is not technically 
"the law of this case," a point plaintiff addressed in her prior 
brief. 11 Defendant does not explain how its argument on law of 
the case, even if accepted, would change the virtual certainty 
that the Court of Appeals would refuse to reconsider, much less 
modify, its decision that plaintiff was constructively 
discharged. In effect, defendant asks this Court to embark on a 
quixotic quest. 
Nor do we understand what is intended by Subpart II.E of 
defendant's brief. There defendant seems to suggest that this 
Court was wrong in holding that plaintiff's departure from Price 
Waterhouse would bar her from all relief for the period after her 
resignation, and that her resignation would merely affect the 
question of mitigation. If that is so, then the debate on 
_y Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals' mandate is 
the same as its opinion, so that by vacating its original mandate 
. the court also vacated its opinion. As a legal matter, however, 
~ a~pe -at.e- court's opinion is distinct from its mandate, -w-:ttf1 
th~ ~-tt=E--,ifeing the specific direction th~t is given to a lower 
cou t:---:rne D.C. Circuit has noted the distinction. E.g., city 
of Cleveland v. Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344, 346-47 
n.25 ("[i]t has long been recognized that the court's opinion may 
be consulted to ascertain the intent of the mandate"). Typically 
the mandate is embodied ~in the opinion, and for that reason 
the rules provide that the appellate court's opinion ordinarily 
constitutes the mandate. The two are distinct, though, as the 
present case shows. 
Here the D.C. Circuit's original mandate "affirm[ed] the 
District Court's liability determination and reverse[d] and 
remand[ed] the case for determination of appropriate damages and 
relief." Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). In light of the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal 
on liability, the D.C. Circuit's mandate was no longer 
appropriate, and the court vacated it. But the opinion on 
unappealed issues relating to relief was still viable, and it was 
not vacated. 
Defendant argues that this Court's ruling that the failure 
to repropose plaintiff was nondiscriminatory is also the law of 
the case. This may be so but does not aid defendant, since the 




constructive discharge is an arid one, and the more fruitful 
discussion concerns the amount and character of relief plaintiff 
ought to receive if she should prevail on liability. These, we 
believe, are the only open issues left in any event, and we confine 
the balance of this reply to those issues. 
II. There Is No Bar To The Relief 
Sought By Plaintiff 
Defendant has not made any persuasive new arguments against 
granting plaintiff admission to partnership as the proper future 
relief. It again argues that Title VII does not provide for such 
relief but fails to explain how the decision in Hishon v. 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1989), can otherwise be given meaning 
since defendant also opposes "front earnings." Indeed, to the 
extent that defendant argues the imponderables and undesirability 
of front earnings, it indirectly reinforces the simplicity and 
viability of a partnership award. One kind of relief or the 
other is surely required by the principle that Title VII is 
intended to provide make-whole relief. 
Defendant returns to the argument that plaintiff should have 
no relief beyond June 30, 1984 because she was not reproposed for 
admission to partnership. Defendant also argues that plaintiff's 
relief should be cut off then because she failed to mitigate 
damages. 
The first of these arguments ignores the fact that both this 
Court and the Court of Appeals have already rejected its premise 
and have adopted the opposite proposition -- that if plaintiff was 
wrongly denied partnership in 1983, she is entitled to relief which 
-3-
assumes that she would otherwise have become a partner in that year 
and would have continued to be a partner from that time forward. 
Thus, this Court held in 1985 that, but for the unapproved 
attempt to bifurcate this case, the compensation plaintiff would 
have received as a partner between July 1, 1983 and January 17, 
1984 would have been an appropriate subtrahend in calculating her 
monetary relief for that period: 
Because plaintiff has failed to prove a constructive 
discharge, she is not entitled to monetary relief for 
the period subsequent to her resignation. Clark v. 
Marsh, 665 F.2d at 1172. Nevertheless, plaintiff has 
satisfied her bw:den of proving discrimination under 
Title VII and_established the predicate for an award 
of backpay from the date she would have been elected 
partner, July 1, 1983, until voluntary resignation on 
January 17, 1984. Backpay for these feM months, 
limited to the difference between plaintiff's 
compensation as a senior rranager during that period 
and what her cornpensation would have been if elected 
to partnership, might have been appropriate if proof 
had been presented. However, no evidence has been 
presented on what compensation plaintiff would have 
received if she had been elected partner. 
~ 
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1121 (D.C. 1109, 
1121; emphasis added. ~-
~ 
-
The Court of Appeals accept.ed this formulation of the 
backpay calculation as correct, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 
F.2d at 465; and, because it found that there was a constructive 
discharge, it ordered a remand to this Court for an award of 
backpay on this basis covering the post-resignation period as 
well. Id. at 473. The Supreme Court's decision on liability did 
not disturb these rulings on relief. 
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The necessary premise of these rulings is that plaintiff 
should have been made a partner in July 1983, so that the failure 
to repropose her later that year is immaterial. Defendant's 
attempt to reargue this point is not based on any intervening 
events or new evidence which would justify such a departure from 
the law of the case. 
Defendant also suggests that factually plaintiff has not 
kept up her skills in management consulting sufficiently to 
warrant making her a partner in Price Waterhouse. It bases this 
argument entirely on Mr. Connor's almost-offhand view as the 
courtroom representative of Price Waterhouse that, "I think she 
probably is rusty now in the systems area. That's my judgment, 
you know. Just hearing it yesterday." Tr. 248. Y 
Defendant made no attempt to test plaintiff's "rustiness." 
It did not try to qualify Mr. Connor (a C.P.A. by training) as an 
expert. It did not call any of its Management Advisory Services 
partners to testify on this point. This argument clearly comes 
as a weak afterthought. Indeed, defense counsel quickly moved 
beyond it by asking Mr. Connor to assume "that she has kept up or 
she could bring herself up to speed quickly otherwise." Tr. 
248. This Court has been given no factual basis for a contrary 
assumption. 
y Again, transcript references are to the 1990 relief trial 
record unless otherwise noted. 
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III. Defendant Has Failed to 
Assume, Much Less Discharge, Its 
Burden to Prove Failure to Mitigate 
Defendant offered proof that over 30 people have left Price 
Waterhouse and have became partners in other "Big 6" (formerly 
"Big 8") firms. Only four of these, however, had been rejected 
after being proposed for partnership at Price Waterhouse. Tr. 
219. ]_/ Defendant's witness on this point acknowledged that 
several career patterns are "typical" for senior managers leaving 
Price Waterhouse and that one of these is setting up one's own 
business -- as both plaintiff and her former husband had done. 
Tr. 217-218. Defendant belabors the point that plaintiff could 
have gotten herself on a partnership track in another firm, but 
the Court viewed partnership election as unpredictable. "[T]he 
partnership thing is just one of those things that eventually hit 
with some place, one person one time, and another person another 
time." Tr. 224. As noted below (n.3), the odds were very much 
against plaintiff's becoming a partner elsewhere after having 
been rejected at Price Waterhouse. Moreover, the firm offered 
most of these people who left it professional placement 
assistance, which it did not offer plaintiff. Tr. 14, 273, 301, 
311. 
]_J Defendant is wrong in asserting that over 30 of its 
former employees had become partners elsewhere after being 
rejected for partnership at Price Waterhouse (see defendant's 
brief at 29 and n.13). In fact, only four rejected candidates 
became partners in other firms (see DX A-7), while at least 100 




The evidence also showed that in the mid-1980's senior 
employee salaries were not as good at several of the other Big 6 
firms as at Price Waterhouse. Tr. 185 (Beach-Deloitte & Touche); 
Tr. 195 (Gray - Coopers & Lybrand); Tr. 200-201 (Grimm - Ernst & 
Young); Tr. 205 (Wren - Arthur Andersen & Co). Indeed, those 
salaries were not materially better at three of the four other 
firms about which there was evidence than plaintiff's average 
self-employment earnings between 1984 and 1987, when she decided 
to seek a job at the World Bank. See PX A-15; Tr. 56, 60. 
Defendant's suggestion that plaintiff could have become a 
partner in another firm is also refuted by its own placement 
expert, Mr. Redford. He even implied that individuals who had 
filed suits such as this one should go to the length of lying in 
order to conceal that from prospective employers and should 
continue to lie if they did get hired. His euphemism was 
"stretch their imaginations." Tr. 314-15. That kind of advice 
is impractical as well as deplorable. 
Apart from suggesting that plaintiff might have become a 
partner in another Big 6 firm after several years as a senior 
employee,.!/ defendant has not offered any proof that plaintiff 
had career options that would have resulted in better 
compensation than her current position at the World Bank. Tr. 
12. It was defendant's burden to do so, of course; it was not 
_!/ This of course is merely a possibility. Nor is it clear 
that beginning partners at all of these firms earn more than 
plaintiff's current $92,500 compensation at the World Bank. See 
Tr. 186, 195. Arthur Andersen, which does pay more, gives its 
partners almost no retirement benefits. Tr. 268. 
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